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ABSTRACT 
 
J. Joseph Porter: The Inclusivist Anomaly Is Not an Anomaly: A Reply to Buchanan and Powell 
(Under the direction of Jerry Postema) 
 
 
In their forthcoming book The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory, Allen 
Buchanan and Russell Powell argue that evolutionary theory cannot explain the inclusivist 
anomaly—the relatively recent emergence of inclusivist moral commitments such as 
commitments to abolition or human rights—because the motivations which brought about the 
inclusivist anomaly are not accounted for by evolutionary theory. I argue, pace Buchanan and 
Powell, that evolutionary theory can account for the motivations which brought about the 
inclusivist anomaly, and that the inclusivist anomaly is therefore not an anomaly after all. 
iv  
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“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be 
done: and there is no new thing under the sun.” 
— Ecclesiastes 1.9 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
In their forthcoming book The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory, Allen 
Buchanan and Russell Powell offer a “theory of moral progress,” which (among other things) 
“characterize[s] the bio-social environments in which especially important true or justified moral 
beliefs are likely (and unlikely) to occur and become widespread.”1 Buchanan and Powell are 
most interested in “one especially important type of moral progress: gains in what [they] refer to 
as ‘moral inclusivity,’”2 which they describe as the extension of “equal basic status or some kind 
of moral standing to classes of individuals that had previously been excluded”3 or the rejection of 
unjustifiable “group-based restrictions on membership in the moral community, such as those 
based on race, ethnicity, gender, species, or self-serving cooperative relationships between 
groups.”4 Buchanan and Powell aim to “offer a theory of the conditions under which that kind of 
moral progress”—namely, inclusivist progress in moral beliefs, norms, concepts, emotions, and 
1 Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell, The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory (Oxford: 
forthcoming) 15. 
2  Buchanan and Powell 21. 
3  Buchanan and Powell 18. 
4  Buchanan and Powell 21. 
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behavior—“is likely to occur, based on an analysis of the conditions under which it has occurred, 
in the light of the best available evolutionary thinking about the origins of human morality.”5 (I 
shall refer to our moral beliefs, norms, concepts, emotions, behavior, and the like together as our 
moral commitments.) 
In the course of offering their theory of moral progress, Buchanan and Powell point out 
an apparent evolutionary puzzle: “Contemporary morality, as experienced and exhibited by 
significant numbers of people and embodied in social practices and institutions, is strikingly 
more inclusive than one would expect if selectionist [or other evolutionary] explanations were 
the whole story, or even most of it.”6 Buchanan and Powell do not think that the inclusivist shift 
in moral commitments beginning in the latter half of the eighteenth century seen in “the 
abolitionist, civil rights, human rights, and animal welfare movements … can be explained by 
the received selectionist account of the origins of morality, nor by alternative evolutionary 
accounts.”7 In their view, the emergence of inclusivist morality—the inclusivist anomaly, as they 
call it—requires a non-evolutionary explanation of its own, apart from evolutionary explanations 
of the origins of (exclusivist) morality. 
Buchanan and Powell argue that the inclusivist anomaly requires a non-evolutionary 
explanation because it constitutes an untethering of our moral commitments from their original 
evolutionary functions: “the achievement of coordination and conflict management within the 
group and successful competition with other groups in ways that were conducive to individual 
and/or cultural group fitness.”8 In their view, this untethering came about because we were 
5 Buchanan and Powell 23. 
6 Buchanan and Powell 153. 
7 Buchanan and Powell 40, 153. 
8 Buchanan and Powell 400. 
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“effectively motivated to realize [inclusivist] alterations in our behavior”9 through the exercise of 
our moral capacities—not just “irrespective of functional considerations” but often even in spite 
of such strategic considerations.10 Our inclusivist motivations would be inexplicable, they think, 
unless we were capable of recognizing and being motivated by inclusivist moral truths even in 
the absence of strategic reasons to be motivated by them. Thus Buchanan and Powell contend 
that the inclusivist anomaly requires a non-evolutionary explanation because any plausible 
explanation of the inclusivist anomaly must “advert to moral motivations that are not accounted 
for by evolutionary theory.”11 
In this essay, I shall argue—pace Buchanan and Powell—that evolutionary theory can 
account for the motivations which brought about the inclusivist anomaly, and that explanations 
of the inclusivist anomaly need not advert to motivations unaccounted for by evolutionary 
theory. In my view, evolutionary theory can account for the motivations underlying inclusivist 
morality (or “inclusivism”) much as it can account for the motivations underlying exclusivist 
morality (“exclusivism”). In my view, that is to say, the inclusivist anomaly is not really an 
anomaly after all. 
I shall defend this view by suggesting plausible status-enhancing motivations underlying 
the inclusivist shift which are accounted for by evolutionary theory. I shall begin by laying out 
more fully Buchanan and Powell’s non-evolutionary explanation of the inclusivist anomaly. I 
shall briefly discuss my antecedent wariness of such non-evolutionary explanations. I shall then 
sketch my own provisional explanation of the inclusivist anomaly and defend and fill in that 
 
 
9  Buchanan and Powell 385. 
10  Buchanan and Powell 88. 
11 Buchanan and Powell 174 (emphasis added). 
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sketch by replying to various potential objections. I shall conclude with some brief remarks on 
the importance of a good understanding of the inclusivist anomaly. 
 
 
II. Buchanan and Powell on the Inclusivist Anomaly 
 
 
The modest naturalistic goal of The Evolution of Moral Progress is 
 
to determine whether and how certain types of putative moral progress are 
possible, and to assess their limits, within the strictures of our best 
scientific theories of human moral psychology and culture. … A further 
aim of this book is to reconcile normative theorizing about moral progress 
and the prevailing evolutionary understandings of moral psychology and 
culture with which they appear to be in tension.12 
 
Buchanan and Powell are interested in the possibility of moral progress. In particular, they are 
interested in the question whether human psychology and social environments constrain 
inclusivist moral progress, which encompasses 
the recognition that nonhuman animals have moral standing and the costly 
efforts to treat them accordingly, the pervasiveness of “universalizing” 
moral judgments, the existence of a human rights culture that includes 
significant institutional and legal manifestations, and an implicit shift from 
a strategic conception of morality as cooperative group reciprocity to a 
subject-centered one in which individuals who have no strategic capacities 
are recognized to have moral standing and, in the case of human beings, to 
have the highest moral status.13 
 
In Buchanan and Powell’s view, inclusivist moral progress appears to be in tension with our best 
evolutionary accounts of moral psychology and culture. The resolution of this tension—the 
 
 
 
 
12 Buchanan and Powell 33. 
13 Buchanan and Powell 384. 
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“reconcil[iation] of normative theorizing about moral progress and the prevailing evolutionary 
understandings of moral psychology and culture”—is one main purpose of their book. 
Three quick clarifications before proceeding any further: First, though Buchanan and 
Powell often speak of inclusivism and exclusivism as discrete, they acknowledge that 
moral exclusivity and inclusivity [are not] discrete character states that can 
be switched on and off. To the contrary, they are clearly continuous rather 
than binary features. That is to say, moralities can be more or less 
inclusive, and they may be inclusive in some dimensions while being 
exclusive in others, as a result of the complex interaction of biological, 
psychological, and cultural forces shaping moral development and 
evolution.14 
 
I happily acknowledge the same. Though I often follow Buchanan and Powell in speaking of 
inclusivism and exclusivism as though they were discrete, I think of “inclusivism” and 
“exclusivism” as relative terms, and think of the so-called inclusivist anomaly not as the 
emergence of something categorically new but as the gradual emergence of a more inclusivist 
moral system from a less inclusivist one. 
Second, Buchanan and Powell are interested in moral progress as such—as something 
normatively real—and are thus “committed to the truth of certain normative ethical claims” in 
their explanation of it even though they “do not offer a normative ethical theory.”15 I, however, 
wish to explain what they call inclusivist moral progress without committing myself to the truth 
of any normative ethical claims; I intend my explanation of the inclusivist anomaly to be 
compatible with both moral realism and moral nihilism and both moral inclusivism and moral 
 
 
 
 
14 Buchanan and Powell 193. 
15 Buchanan and Powell 15. “For example, we assume that slavery and other forms of bondage, as well as 
discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, or religion, are morally wrong.” 
6  
exclusivism. I shall therefore speak in this essay of inclusivist moral change instead of inclusivist 
moral progress. 
Third, because Buchanan and Powell develop their explanation of the inclusivist anomaly 
(and overarching theory of moral progress) over the course of four hundred pages, I cannot do 
full justice to every subtlety of their explanation. But I do not think that my reasons for rejecting 
it, or for accepting my own explanation, turn much on any of these subtleties. 
 
 
Buchanan and Powell’s Rejection of Evolutionary Explanations of the Inclusivist Anomaly 
 
Why do Buchanan and Powell think that inclusivist moral change appears to be in tension 
with evolutionary theory? According to standard evolutionary accounts of the origins of morality 
in human societies, exclusivism—characterized by “in-group favoritism/empathy and out-group 
antagonism/antipathy”16—was fitness-enhancing for the “small, scattered groups of weakly 
genetically related human beings competing with other groups for crucial resources” in the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation (hereafter, “EEA”): the lengthy prehistoric period 
leading up to the Agricultural Revolution about twelve thousand years ago during which our 
moral capacities evolved.17 According to these accounts, early humans who cooperated with 
ingroup members—while not cooperating with, or at least not treating equally, outgroup 
members—would have fared better in the EEA than both those who did not effectively cooperate 
within ingroups and those who cooperated (as it were) “too much” with outgroup members, 
 
 
 
 
16 Buchanan and Powell 130. 
17 Buchanan and Powell 80. According to standard characterizations of the EEA, it was an environment in which 
“small, scattered groups of weakly genetically related human beings compet[ed] with other groups for crucial 
resources.” 
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thereby risking attack, disease, and exploitation.18 Hence exclusivism emerged because it 
encouraged cooperation with strategically advantageous partners (trustworthy ingroup members) 
while discouraging cooperation with everyone else. Exclusivism, in short, emerged as a 
“strategic conception of morality as cooperative group reciprocity” because it approximated a 
fitness-optimizing “sweet spot” of cooperative behavior.19 
If exclusivism approximated such a fitness-optimizing “sweet spot” in the EEA, however, 
then the emergence of inclusivism seems a fitness-reducing, and therefore anomalous, departure 
from this sweet spot—something that cannot be explained by (roughly) fitness-optimizing 
evolutionary mechanisms alone. What, then, has motivated such a shift? Why have the past few 
hundred years brought it about? 
Buchanan and Powell’s approach to these questions is nuanced. On the one hand, they 
argue that no “adequate evolutionary explanation has been given for the inclusivist features of 
contemporary human morality”20; on the other hand, they strive to find a place for evolution in 
their explanation of the inclusivist anomaly and “sketch a model of inclusivist moral progress 
that is not only consistent with, but affirmatively draws upon and unifies, current biological and 
social scientific understandings of moral psychology and culture.”21 Buchanan and Powell thus 
offer a “naturalistic theory that can account for the ‘inclusivist anomaly’” according to which 
evolution has produced ‘adaptively plastic’ moral psychological 
mechanisms that are configured to prevent inclusivist moral norms and 
dispositions from developing in certain environments, while allowing 
 
18 See especially Buchanan and Powell 81: “[D]ata and theory suggest that morality evolved in a highly competitive 
intergroup environment in which extending altruism to out-group members would often have been evolutionarily 
deleterious. The result was the evolution of a highly parochial altruism.” 
19 Buchanan and Powell 384. 
20 Buchanan and Powell 40. 
21 Buchanan and Powell 151-152. 
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them to flourish in others. … [T]he view we propose emphasizes that 
human beings’ evolved moral nature both enables morality in the form of 
inclusiveness and thwarts it, depending upon environmental factors 
broadly conceived, including cultural and institutional conditions.22 
 
In Buchanan and Powell’s view, whether or not inclusivism emerges among the members of a 
certain population depends upon that population’s environment; some environments foster 
inclusivism while others thwart it. 
Why, then, do Buchanan and Powell reject evolutionary explanations of inclusivism? 
 
Buchanan and Powell argue that inclusivism cannot be evolutionary explained because it cannot 
plausibly be shown to be the selected-for result or byproduct of any evolutionary mechanism 
such as genetic drift or natural selection—genetic or cultural.23 Inclusivism, Buchanan and 
Powell contend, did not emerge simply because it was selected for (for instance, because new 
ecological conditions made it “fitness enhancing or otherwise advantageous,” as they think 
Philip Kitcher would say,24 because it was the byproduct of some other selected-for trait or 
capacity, or for any other such evolutionary reason. They reject all the candidate evolutionary 
explanations of inclusivism which they survey in The Evolution of Moral Progress as 
unsatisfactory. 
For instance, Buchanan and Powell reject one selectionist explanation of inclusivism 
according to which it is like a peacock’s tail: a hard-to-fake, sexually attractive signal of vigor. 
“To make this case,” they write, 
 
22 Buchanan and Powell 42. 
23 On Buchanan and Powell’s view on the scope of evolutionary explanation, see inter alia Buchanan and Powell 43: 
“We [allow] for extending evolutionary explanations beyond genetics, to encompass cultural selectionist 
explanations.” 
24 Buchanan and Powell 161. “Kitcher … appears to argue that recent expansions of our moral circle are due to the 
presence of ecological conditions that make such expansions fitness enhancing or otherwise advantageous.” See 
Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Harvard: 2014). 
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one would need to show that (1) culturally acquiring inclusivist moral 
traits supplies an advantage in sexual competition that outweighs its 
straightforward costs to fitness outside of the mating context, and (2) that 
this advantage has resulted in the proliferation of these traits in human 
populations.25 
 
Neither of these claims, they argue, is “plausible enough to warrant serious consideration”— nor 
are similar claims buttressing other selectionist explanations plausible.26 
Buchanan and Powell also reject non-selectionist evolutionary explanations of 
inclusivism such as byproduct explanations, in part because these explanations cannot obviously 
account for inclusivism’s uneven geographic distribution (not to mention its very recent 
emergence): 
The existence of basic moral adaptations may help to explain why humans 
exhibit inclusivist moral features while, say, chimps (assuming they lack 
basic moral adaptations) do not; but this does not explain why some 
behaviorally modern humans exhibit inclusivist moral features while other 
behaviorally modern humans do not, since both possess basic moral 
adaptations. Whatever the crucial difference-makers here might be, they 
will not be evolved psychological capacities.27 
 
To be sure, Buchanan and Powell acknowledge that “the human capacity for norm acquisition 
and implementation (including motivations for adherence and enforcement) is likely adaptive, 
and was selected for its ability to coordinate action and support cooperation within groups, with 
 
 
25  Buchanan and Powell 164. 
26  Buchanan and Powell 164. 
27 Buchanan and Powell 168. See also Buchanan and Powell 167: “[I]nclusivist moral features are not plausible 
candidates for byproduct explanation because they have not reliably accompanied any of the putatively relevant 
adaptations thought to have arisen in the EEA. For tens or hundreds of thousands of years, human beings possessed 
the whole suite of cognitive and emotional adaptations that plausibly underpin morality—such as capacities for 
norm following, perspective taking, preference for consistency in belief, and the parochial altruism characteristic of 
group-restricted morality. And yet very few human beings exhibited anything approaching the full suite of 
inclusivist moral features that now characterize morality for many people today until very recently in human 
history.” 
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specific norms culturally selected for these effects.”28 But the mere existence of such a capacity, 
they contend, cannot explain the recentness, degree, and uneven distribution of the inclusivist 
shift. 
Thus Buchanan and Powell conclude that “none of [the main] inclusivist features of 
contemporary morality can be accounted for by selectionist, sexual selectionist, or byproduct 
evolutionary explanations,”29 because most or all of these features seem to “[come] with 
attendant fitness costs that are difficult to explain on standard evolutionary accounts.”30 Since the 
inclusivist shift has been fitness-reducing, inclusivist motivation cannot be accounted for by 
evolutionary theory. 
Two more quick clarifications: First, I do not think that Buchanan and Powell, in arguing 
that the inclusivist anomaly cannot be evolutionary explained, wish to commit themselves to any 
particular account of evolutionary explanation. On the contrary, it seems to me that they intend 
what they say concerning evolutionary explanation to be fairly philosophically uncontroversial: 
If the motivations for a change in moral commitments like the inclusivist shift cannot be 
accounted for by evolutionary theory, then that change cannot be explained by evolutionary 
theory; if they can, however, then that change can be so explained. I accept both these claims. I 
take it that my disagreement with Buchanan and Powell in this essay has to do with the sources 
of inclusivist motivation, and not with the nature or possible scope of evolutionary explanation. 
Second, I take it that what Buchanan and Powell mean when they say that a motivation is 
accounted for by evolutionary theory is simply that it motivates behaviors or other commitments 
which admit of selectionist, byproduct, or other evolutionary explanations. (Thus our motivation 
28 Buchanan and Powell 136-137. 
29  Buchanan and Powell 384. 
30  Buchanan and Powell 160. 
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to drink, for instance, is easily accounted for by evolutionary theory.) Accordingly, Buchanan 
and Powell reject evolutionary accounts of inclusivist motivation for two main reasons: first, 
inclusivist commitments consistently go against our strategic interests and are therefore fitness- 
reducing; second, inclusivism’s recentness and uneven spread rule out byproduct explanations of 
its emergence (since the capacities of which it is byproduct arose long before it did and are 
shared by contemporary exclusivists). 
 
 
Buchanan and Powell’s Explanation of the Inclusivist Anomaly 
 
We have seen that Buchanan and Powell argue that “inclusivist morality is not amenable 
to standard evolutionary explanations.”31 And yet “[a]n explanation is needed of the curious fact 
that, although human beings apparently began with highly constrained, group-based moralities, 
many of them have come to have moralities that are much more inclusive.”32 What, then, is their 
explanation of the inclusivist anomaly? 
One important part of Buchanan and Powell’s explanation is what they call the open- 
ended normativity of the ethical, or “capacity for open-ended normativity” (hereafter “COEN”), 
a conditionally expressed capacity which has become widespread only recently and only in the 
environments in which inclusivism has flourished.33 “[A]ny naturalistic account of the inclusivist 
shift,” Buchanan and Powell write, “will feature a capacity that we have called the open-ended 
normativity of the ethical. This is the capacity to reflect on and revise our moral norms and 
 
 
 
 
 
31  Buchanan and Powell 182. 
32  Buchanan and Powell 180. 
33 Buchanan and Powell 88. 
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modify our behavior accordingly, even when doing so is not only not fitness enhancing, but even 
fitness reducing.”34 
COEN is not just any of our “capacities for norm following, perspective taking, 
preference for consistency in belief, and the parochial altruism characteristic of group-restricted 
morality” which humans acquired “tens or hundreds of thousands of years” ago long before the 
inclusivist shift took place.35 Instead, COEN is “the ability to critically reflect on and revise 
moral norms”36 for moral reasons regardless of subsequent fitness and “to become effectively 
motivated to realize [concomitant] alterations in our behavior.”37 In other words, it is the 
capacity for “valid moral reasoning”38—or moral reasoning “of the right sort”39—untethered 
from morality’s original fitness-enhancing functions. 
Buchanan and Powell argue that only something like COEN can explain the inclusivist 
 
shift: 
 
[A] naturalistic account of how inclusive moral commitments emerge 
despite the evolved parochiality of human moral emotions, judgments and 
norms, cannot simply appeal solely to capacities for reason or self- 
scrutiny, nor to strategic self-serving relations between groups. It must 
identify the conditions under which reasoning capacities are exercised in 
such a way as to foster inclusivist commitments even in the absence of 
strategic motivations. … Explanations that advert solely or principally to 
the modulation of ancestral moral sentiments under modern environmental 
conditions, without assigning any role to the capacity for open-ended 
normativity, will not suffice.40 
 
34 Buchanan and Powell 180-181. 
35  Buchanan and Powell 167. 
36  Buchanan and Powell 182. 
37  Buchanan and Powell 385. 
38  Buchanan and Powell 151. 
39  Buchanan and Powell 148. 
40 Buchanan and Powell 151, 183 (emphasis added). 
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Inclusivist commitments to causes like abolition, human rights, and animal welfare cannot be 
explained away as “modulations of ancestral moral sentiments,” Buchanan and Powell contend, 
because these ancestral sentiments were strategically constrained and therefore fitness-enhancing 
in a way that inclusivist commitments are not.41 “The fact that inclusivist institutions now extend 
moral consideration to millions of strangers we will never encounter—namely, our fellow 
citizens in the modern state—is hard enough to explain given the standard evolutionary account 
of parochial altruism”; how much more our extension of such consideration to non-human 
animals, foreigners, and others who clearly are not strategic partners?42 After all, the extension of 
such consideration has often seemed costly enough to be strategically disadvantageous. Take 
British abolitionism, one of Buchanan and Powell’s main examples: When the British 
government abolished slavery, it paid out twenty million pounds—a sum roughly equivalent to 
one hundred billion 2018 dollars—to former slaveholders. Or take inclusivist concern for the 
welfare of animals, another main example of theirs: “The financial cost of enforcing laws for the 
better treatment of nonhuman animals are considerable, and the willingness of the public to bear 
it cannot be explained in terms of strategic self-interest.”43 What could plausibly explain such 
costly inclusivist commitments and inclusivism’s remarkable strides since the eighteenth 
century? The only explanation Buchanan and Powell see is that increasing numbers of humans 
have become “effectively motivated to exercise [COEN] and to act on the results of its exercise, 
irrespective of functional considerations.”44 
 
41  Buchanan and Powell 183. 
42  Buchanan and Powell 180. 
43  Buchanan and Powell 154. 
44 Buchanan and Powell 88. 
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One key assumption of Buchanan and Powell’s argument is that inclusivist commitments 
and other commitments which go against our strategic interests (and our ingroups’ strategic 
interests) are ipso facto fitness-reducing. (Thus bearing the financial cost of laws securing animal 
rights is supposed to be strategically disadvantageous and therefore fitness-reducing—and 
therefore evolutionarily inexplicable, because the motivation to bear such a cost is not accounted 
for by evolutionary theory.) I am willing to grant (though perhaps not unreservedly endorse) 
something like this assumption. What I am unwilling to grant, and what I shall argue against, is 
that inclusivist commitments are in fact strategically disadvantageous. 
As we have seen, then, Buchanan and Powell argue that any plausible explanation of the 
inclusivist anomaly must “advert to moral motivations that are not accounted for by evolutionary 
theory”: non-strategic motivations which can arise only from the exercise of a capacity like 
COEN. “[E]ven if a selectionist explanation of certain aspects of [inclusivist] morality could be 
given,” they say, “this would still leave much of contemporary morality beyond the scope of 
evolutionary explanation altogether.”45 Therefore any plausible explanation of the inclusivist 
anomaly must advert to some COEN-like ability to recognize inclusivist moral reasons and be 
motivated by them to change our moral commitments. 
Only certain environments, however, “[foster] the exercise of [COEN],” and thus 
inclusivism.46 In Buchanan and Powell’s view, “exclusivist moral response is a conditionally 
expressed trait that develops only when cues that were in the past reliably correlated with 
outgroup predation, exploitation, competition for resources, and disease-transmission are 
detected.”47 Exclusivist and inclusivist moral response are therefore adaptively plastic. 
 
 
45  Buchanan and Powell 137. 
46  Buchanan and Powell 209. 
47  Buchanan and Powell 190. 
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What, for Buchanan and Powell, explains this adaptive plasticity? In their view, since 
 
such an adaptively plastic moral psychological mechanism … evolved, 
there must have been reliable periodic selection pressures generated by 
both exclusivist-friendly and inclusivist-friendly ecological regimes. … 
An evolved moral psychology that included an adaptively plastic capacity 
to respond to strangers would have been more fitness enhancing than one 
that was “hard-wired” for exclusion. … [F]rom the standpoint of both 
theory and experimental evidence, the adaptive plasticity hypothesis fares 
better than the “hard-wired” hypothesis.48 
 
If different moral responses would have been fitness-optimizing in different environments—if, 
for instance, certain kinds of cooperation with outgroup members would have been beneficial in 
some environments but harmful in others—then we have reason to believe that our moral 
responses evolved to be adaptively plastic. “Full-fledged” inclusivism, to be sure, would never 
have been fitness-enhancing in the EEA, but a certain degree of “proto-inclusivism” (say, an 
increased willingness to trade and otherwise cooperate with outgroup members) might have 
been—in which case, Buchanan and Powell think that an evolutionary account of capacity for 
open-ended normativity can be told. This capacity’s open-endedness would enable proto- 
inclusivist responses in certain past environments and, in certain recent environments, full- 
fledged inclusivism. 
What environments, then, foster the exercise of COEN and inclusivism? “Whether the 
potential for inclusivist morality is realized depends,” Buchanan and Powell contend, 
upon a number of factors, including the presence of incentives for 
developing cooperative relationships with strangers (which markets 
preeminently provide) and on cultural innovations of various sorts, 
including communication and transportation technologies that link 
previously separated groups, techniques for perspective-taking, reductions 
 
 
 
48 Buchanan and Powell 192, 204, 208. 
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in parasite threat, and improvements in moral concepts and moral 
reasoning. … [A] complex social-epistemic environment is needed.49 
 
Such environments, of course, have appeared only very recently: 
 
While evolutionary developmental environments have favored varying 
degrees of exclusivity over the course of human history, conditions 
amenable to the exercise of [COEN] and hence to the development of 
more inclusivist moralities appear to be rare. In particular, they seem to be 
connected to a range of recent socio-political developments that have 
taken place predominantly in highly resourced populations. Such 
developments include (inter alia) healthcare and public health 
infrastructures, reductions in crime, rule of law, property rights, literacy, 
and the emergence of markets, to name a few. There is an important sense, 
therefore, in which inclusivist morality is a luxury good.50 
 
Thus inclusivism is anomalous because conditions amenable to the exercise of COEN have 
appeared only recently and (as of yet) in only some parts of the world. Such conditions have 
made the inclusivist shift of the past few centuries possible by fostering the exercise of COEN, 
through which large groups of humans have been motivated for the first time in history to go 
against their strategic interests by taking on inclusivist commitments. 
In short, Buchanan and Powell argue that evolutionary theory does not explain the 
inclusivist anomaly because it does not account for the motivations which brought the inclusivist 
anomaly about: fitness-reducing moral motivations which arose from the exercise of COEN, 
once environmental conditions made the widespread exercise of COEN possible. 
Buchanan and Powell therefore offer two different explanations of exclusivism and 
inclusivism. Exclusivism, in their view, has a straightforward evolutionary explanation: It was 
selected for because it was fitness-enhancing. Inclusivism, however, not cannot have such a 
 
49 Buchanan and Powell 209, 218. 
50 Buchanan and Powell 212. 
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straightforward explanation, because it is not fitness-enhancing. Though the emergence of 
inclusivism is consistent with evolutionary theory (if in fact human moral capacities evolved to 
be adaptively plastic), evolutionary theory alone cannot explain the inclusivist anomaly itself, 
because any plausible explanation of that anomaly will have to advert to moral motivations 
unaccounted for by evolutionary theory. 
 
 
III. Reasons for Antecedent Wariness of Buchanan and Powell’s Explanation 
 
 
Soon I shall offer my own sketch of an explanation of the inclusivist anomaly. Before I 
do, however, I should perhaps mention and explain my antecedent wariness of Buchanan and 
Powell’s explanation of the inclusivist anomaly, and give some reasons for assigning what could 
be loosely spoken of as a low prior probability to non-evolutionary explanations like theirs of 
biocultural phenomenona like inclusivism. 
There are many things we humans do, feel, and believe which do not admit of any 
obvious evolutionary explanation. Indeed, many of the things which we do, feel, and believe 
seem prima facie fitness-reducing. Consider ritual practices of human sacrifice once common 
across the world. Naturally, these practices could be extremely costly; historical anthropologist 
Ross Hassig estimates that between ten and eighty thousand persons were sacrificed in just one 
day when the Great Pyramid of Tenochtitlan was reconsecrated in 1487.51 It is therefore hard to 
see how such practices could have been fitness-enhancing—especially when children or young 
women were sacrificed—and hard to see how the motivations underlying such practices could be 
“accounted for by evolutionary theory.” But even if we do not have an evolutionary explanation 
 
51 Ross Hassig, “El sacrificio y las guerras floridas,” Arqueología Mexicana 63 2003: 47. 
18  
of human sacrifice—I myself do not have one ready at hand—I presume most of us would assent 
to something like the following: 
Certainly practices of human sacrifice seem at first glance to have been 
very costly and fitness-reducing; and yet such practices were once 
common across the world. They must, therefore, have some kind of 
evolutionary explanation, even if we do not yet know what it is. Perhaps 
such sacrifices do not have an obvious selectionist or other evolutionary 
explanation; still, evolutionary theory must be able at least to account for 
the motivations underlying them. Many things we do—music-making, 
stamp-collecting, watching strangers play football—do not have obvious 
evolutionary explanations, and yet we do not suppose that evolutionary 
theory cannot somehow account for our motivation to make music, collect 
stamps, or watch football. We should be wary, then, of too quickly seeking 
a non-evolutionary explanation of human sacrifice. 
 
Much the same, it seems to me, could and should be said of inclusivism. The inclusivist anomaly 
is an undeniable pattern of change in the behavior of millions of social primates across several 
generations; it would therefore seem to cry out for evolutionary explanation. At the very least, I 
would expect evolutionary theory to be able to account for inclusivist motivation. If we cannot 
yet give an evolutionary account of inclusivist motivation, then I should like to ask whether there 
is something about inclusivism that we do not yet understand—rather than simply concluding 
that no such evolutionary account exists. In particular, I should like to ask whether the inclusivist 
anomaly is in fact so fitness-reducing as it seems to Buchanan and Powell and whether there 
exist sources of inclusivist motivation other than the obvious moral ones. 
Hence I am antecedently wary of non-evolutionary explanations of the inclusivist 
anomaly, or of any other pattern of human belief and behavior—“antecedently,” because I assign 
what I have loosely called a low prior probability to such explanations before examining any of 
them specifically. And I am especially wary of such explanations when they appear to steer us 
off the fairly beaten path of evolutionary biology into a thicket of philosophically thorny 
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questions. Buchanan and Powell’s explanation of the inclusivist anomaly seems to presuppose 
(among other things) a moral epistemology according to which only humans in certain 
environments can reliably perceive and be motivated by certain (inclusivist) moral facts. Perhaps 
such a presupposition should not trouble us overmuch. Still, faced with such a moral- 
epistemologically laden explanation of what is at root a biocultural explanandum, I cannot but 
wonder whether our inquiry has taken a wrong turn and whether we should not double back and 
seek some simpler explanatory path. 
Naturally I think that we should, and that such a simpler path exists to be found. Presently 
I shall offer my sketch of it. But, even if my sketch has missed the mark, I doubt that Buchanan 
and Powell’s has hit it. For I expect the true explanation of inclusivism, like the true explanation 
of exclusivism, to be in the main an evolutionary one, which adverts to motivations that are 
accounted for by evolutionary theory. 
 
 
IV. My Sketch of an Explanation of the Inclusivist Anomaly 
 
 
So much for Buchanan and Powell’s explanation of the inclusivist anomaly. What of my 
 
own? 
 
Though Buchanan and Powell see the inclusivist anomaly as a fitness-reducing moral 
shift the motivations for which are not accounted for by evolutionary theory, I myself doubt that 
this shift could have happened had it not been somehow fitness-tracking—reliably (if not 
necessarily) fitness-enhancing—and brought about by (fitness-tracking) motivations accounted 
for by evolutionary theory. But how could it have been fitness-tracking—and, if it was, what 
motivations gave rise to it? 
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Here, in brief, is my answer to these questions, and my sketch of an explanation of the 
inclusivist anomaly: 
It seems to me that our motivations for changing our moral commitments are rarely only 
moral motivations of the kind which Buchanan and Powell think arise in us through the exercise 
of COEN. There are almost always, in addition to such moral motivations, what I shall call 
status-enhancing motivations for changing our moral (and almost all other) commitments— 
motivations for changing our actions and other commitments in order to improve our status 
within certain groups (especially our ingroups)—of which we are often only dimly aware. (I use 
“status” to refer broadly to someone’s sexual attractiveness, prestige, and power. Others, such as 
Robin Hanson and Kevin Simler, use the word to refer more narrowly to prestige and power 
alone.)52 These status-enhancing motivations are of course not mutually exclusive with moral 
motivations; we often do something both because we think it is the morally right thing to do and 
because we are aware, if only very dimly, that doing it would improve our status among our 
peers. Thus we strive to be—or at least strive to be thought of as—good relatives, friends, 
neighbors, colleagues, and citizens not only because we believe that we ought to but also because 
being thought of as good friends, citizens, colleagues, and the like is status-enhancing and 
therefore fitness-tracking and advantageous in many ways. (Why does enhancing one’s status 
reliably enhance one’s reproductive fitness? The short answer—which I will soon fill out—is 
that enhancing one’s status within a group enhances one’s ability to cooperate effectively with 
other members of that group. We evolved to be status seekers because enhancing our status was 
a reliable means of enhancing our reproductive fitness.) 
 
 
52 See Hanson and Simler 30-33. Robin Hanson and Kevin Simler, The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in 
Everyday Life (Oxford: 2018). 
21  
Status-enhancing motivations underlie almost everything we do as humans. As Robin 
Hanson and Kevin Simler (among others) have persuasively argued, our ancestors competed not 
only for food and other material resources but also for social status; in fact, “our ancestors got 
smart primarily in order to compete against each other in a variety of social and political 
scenarios.”53 “Interacting with an organism of approximately equal mental abilities whose 
motives are at times outright malevolent,” Steven Pinker writes, “makes formidable and ever- 
escalating demands on cognition.”54 Our brains evolved to meet these demands. 
One way we evolved to meet these demands is by signaling our status to those around us: 
honestly or deceptively, expensively or cheaply, consciously or unconsciously. (A vain rich man 
might honestly, expensively, and consciously signal his wealth by driving a 2018 Lamborghini 
Veneno; a socially unaware rich man might deceptively, cheaply, and unconsciously signal his 
lack of wealth by driving a used 1997 Buick LeSabre.) In fact, we signal all kinds of information 
about ourselves in all kinds of ways: through our speech, body language, appearance, actions, 
possessions, and associates. 
The inclusivist shift took place because signaling one’s inclusivist commitments became 
status-enhancing in certain parts of the world. (Why and how this happened where and when it 
did are important questions to which I will return in Section V.) Hence the inclusivist anomaly is 
not a fitness-reducing anomaly but instead a fitness-tracking and therefore non-anomalous 
change in moral commitments, the motivation for which was status-enhancing and therefore 
accounted for by evolutionary theory. 
 
 
 
 
53 Hanson and Simler 29. 
54 Steven Pinker, Language, Cognition, and Human Nature: Selected Articles (Oxford: 2015) 150. 
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Consider again the peacock’s tail (or, more properly, its train) as a usefully analogous 
explanandum. Peacocks’ trains, so the evolutionary story goes, are hard-to-fake, sexually 
attractive signals of vigor to peahens. Since fitness costs borne by peacocks because of their 
trains are made up for by the corresponding fitness gains, having extravagant trains is fitness- 
enhancing for them. Peacocks therefore evolved to enhance their sexual attractiveness in part by 
displaying their extravagant trains. 
We humans have likewise evolved to enhance our status in part by displaying various 
moral commitments. More generally, we have evolved to enhance our status in part by 
displaying what Buchanan and Powell would call ideological commitments. Ideologies— 
Buchanan and Powell use the word to refer to systems of belief regardless of specific content— 
function as 
evaluative social maps that orient individuals in their social world by 
fostering and being used to signal an entrenched group-based identity…. 
According to this functionalist conception of ideology, ideologies are 
systems of belief that allow for an expansion of the social identity-group 
well beyond the usual feasible size for empathetic identification and 
strongly altruistic behavior.55 
 
Ideologies, in other words, function as means of creating expanded ingroups. Buchanan and 
Powell give nationalism as a political example of an ideology, but it seems clear that moral, 
religious, and many other kinds of commitments can function ideologically, including inclusivist 
commitments. Inclusivism emerged within certain ideological groups as a status-enhancing 
signal of compassion, generosity, charity, piety, and other established virtues. Its remarkable 
spread since the eighteenth century is the result both of economic, technological, and other 
environmental changes (which have reduced the cost of inclusivist signals) and of the political 
 
55 Buchanan and Powell 407 (emphasis added). 
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successes of inclusivist ideological groups (which have increased the benefits of inclusivist 
signals). 
Therefore the inclusivist anomaly is no anomaly at all. Evolutionary theory, despite what 
Buchanan and Powell say, does advert to (status-enhancing) motivations which largely explain 
our inclusivist and other ideological commitments. The existence of such motivations accords 
with a growing body of research suggesting that “moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc 
construction” shaped by “social and cultural influences.”56 Much of our ideological life—moral, 
 
religious, and political, inclusivist and exclusivist—is motivated to signal our worthiness to 
various prospective and actual friends and allies. So inclusivism does not require a non- 
evolutionary explanation like Buchanan and Powell’s. 
That, in brief sketch, is my provisional explanation of the inclusivist anomaly and of 
inclusivist motivation. In what follows, I shall try to fill out this sketch further by replying to 
several potential objections. 
 
 
V. Objections and Replies 
 
 
Objection: Why would enhanced status within a group enhance one’s ability to cooperate 
effectively with other members of that group? 
 
 
Reply: We humans, as Hanson and Simler observe, are “competitive social animals 
fighting for power, status [i.e., prestige], and sex,”57 which is tantamount to fighting for 
 
56 Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” 
Psychological Review 108 2001: 1. 
57 Hanson and Simler 5. 
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“attention and affection from potential mates, friends, and allies.”58 Enhanced status, then, is 
tantamount to enhanced desirability as a sexual partner, friend, and ally, which is tantamount to 
an enhanced ability to cooperate effectively with members of one’s group—which is tantamount 
(or at least was tantamount in the EEA) to enhanced reproductive fitness. (Recall the importance 
of effective cooperation to standard evolutionary explanations of exclusivism. It seems to me that 
effective cooperation is no less important to a good explanation of competition for status, and 
therefore of ideologies like inclusivism.) 
 
 
Objection: Aren’t you too quick to say that enhanced status is tantamount to enhanced 
reproductive fitness? Isn’t it possible that high status could become negatively correlated with 
reproductive fitness—if, for instance, smaller families and lower reproductive rates became 
signals of high status? 
 
 
Reply: Certainly—and especially in modern environments remarkably different from the 
EEA—our status-seeking “drive” can “misfire” and become negatively correlated with 
reproductive fitness, just as our sugar-seeking drive can. But the claim that our status-seeking 
drive is an evolutionary adaptation does not depend on its reliably tracking reproductive fitness 
now; it depends on its reliably tracking reproductive fitness in the EEA. “[T]o say that something 
is an ‘adaptation,’” after all, “is a strictly backward-looking statement—it is a claim about the 
selective etiology of a trait, not about its present utility or current contribution to survival and 
reproduction.”59 
 
 
58 Hanson and Simler 37. 
59 Buchanan and Powell 119. 
60 Buchanan and Powell 249. 
25 
 
It seems clear to me that our status-seeking drive did in fact reliably track reproductive 
fitness in the EEA. So it seems clear to me that our status-seeking drive is an evolutionary 
adaptation, even if it no longer tracks reproductive fitness as reliably as it once did. 
 
 
Objection: But what do one’s moral or other ideological commitments have to do with 
one’s status, anyway? 
 
 
Reply: Have you ever publicly defended abortion rights in a Southern Baptist church or 
walked through downtown San Francisco wearing a Trump hat? 
Our ideological commitments are some of our most important signals of loyalty to 
various ingroups—not just “purely” ideological ingroups like political ingroups, but also kin 
groups (if we were raised in secular progressive families, for instance, or conservative religious 
ones) and ethnic, regional, cultural, and institutional groups. Buchanan and Powell acknowledge 
that seemingly arbitrary moral norms may serve as “mechanisms for delineating group 
membership, coordinating group action, signaling cooperative intent, and/or maintaining group 
cohesion.”60 There is no reason to think that other norms and ideological commitments may not 
serve the same functions. 
To be sure, as Buchanan and Powell suggest, ideological commitments alone are 
 
ineffective signals of one’s sexual attractiveness, and perhaps also of one’s prestige and power. 
The wrong ideological commitments, however, can easily thwart our efforts to procure sexual 
partners, friends, and allies. Displaying the “right” ideological commitments, or at least not 
displaying the wrong ones, is therefore an important means to securing one’s status. 
61 Buchanan and Powell 407. 
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Objection: Inclusivist commitments are almost by definition commitments to outgroup 
members such as foreigners or nonhuman animals. How could such commitments be signals of 
loyalty to ingroups? 
 
 
Reply: An elderly, female, non-Muslim member of the Democratic Party can display her 
loyalty to the Democratic Party and many others groups merely by writing a Facebook post in 
support of young, male, Muslim refugees. A vegan can display his loyalty to other advocates for 
greater recognition of animal rights—perhaps he works for PETA or simply has several vegan 
friends—merely by writing a Facebook post in opposition to factory farming. Inclusivist 
ingroups obviously exist, and there is no incoherence in the concept of an ideological ingroup 
made up of members with shared commitments to outgroup members. Ideologies, as Buchanan 
and Powell rightly point out, “draw a line around the expanded group, demarcating the moral 
community in ways that exclude other groups”—whether that moral community is demarcated 
by its exclusivist or inclusivist (or other) commitments.61 So inclusivist commitments clearly can 
signal loyalty, and other positive traits, to inclusivist ingroups. 
 
 
Objection: All this talk of signaling is far too cynical. Are you suggesting that inclusivists 
are all insincere? Are you suggesting that abolitionists, civil rights activists, and other 
inclusivists sought social reforms merely to enhance their status? 
 
 
Reply: I am suggesting neither of these things. 
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I do not doubt that most inclusivists, like most exclusivists, sincerely hold to their moral 
views, and act as they do in part because of genuinely moral motivations. I doubt only that 
status-enhancing motivations play an insignificant role in shaping their inclusivist 
commitments—for I doubt that status-enhancing motivations play an insignificant role in 
shaping almost any part of almost any human life. 
 
 
Objection: But almost all inclusivists would deny that status-enhancing motivations shape 
their inclusivist commitments. Are they lying? 
 
 
Reply: I do not say that they are lying. I say that they likely do not fully understand the 
nature of what Bernard Williams usefully called their motivational sets. 
It seems to me a familiar fact of life that we often do, feel, and believe things without 
fully understanding or acknowledging our motivations or reasons for doing, feeling, and 
believing them. More specifically, it seems to me that we often focus on our nobler motivations 
(such as moral motivations) while overlooking our less noble motivations (such as status- 
enhancing motivations). 
Such “self-deception,” as Hanson and Simler argue, has a clear evolutionary explanation. 
Deceiving ourselves concerning the nobility of our motivations improves our ability to deceive 
those around us concerning the nobility of our motivations, which in turn improves our ability to 
signal our worthiness as friends and allies: 
Our brains are built to act in our self-interest while at the same time trying 
hard not to appear selfish in front of other people. And in order to throw 
them off the trail, our brains often keep ‘us,’ our conscious minds, in the 
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dark. The less we know of our own ugly motives, the easier it is to hide 
them from others.62 
 
As a rule, it is not status-enhancing to admit our status-enhancing motivations to our peers, and 
in fact it is often uncomfortable even to admit such status-enhancing motivations to ourselves. 
And yet we clearly have such motivations; after all, competitive social primates that we are, we 
certainly have no trouble detecting and pointing them out in others. Our brains evolved to help us 
compete for status effectively and signal our worthiness as (noble and unselfish) mates, friends, 
and allies. “For the price of a little self-deception,” then, “we get to have our cake and eat it too: 
act in our own best interests without having to reveal ourselves as the self-interested schemers 
we often are.”63 
Hence it is no surprise if less noble and (therefore) less acknowledged motivations shape 
our inclusivist commitments; such motivations shape almost everything we do. The mass of men, 
to paraphrase Thoreau, lead lives of quiet self-deception. 
 
 
Objection: Are you saying that inclusivists have not actually exercised their moral 
capacities when they have revised or abandoned their former exclusivism? 
 
 
Reply: No. Clearly at least some inclusivists—and at least some exclusivists—have come 
to the moral commitments they adopt by exercising their capacities for moral reasoning. (One 
reason I doubt Buchanan and Powell’s explanation of the inclusivist anomaly is that I do not see 
any conditionally expressed moral capacities which only inclusivists, and not exclusivists, have. 
I do not see any moral capacity that inclusivists have which Aristotle and Augustine did not. If 
 
62 Hanson and Simler 5 (emphasis added). 
63 Hanson and Simler 8. 
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Aristotle and Augustine’s moral commitments are bad, I do not see that they are bad because 
Aristotle and Augustine lacked some moral capacity.) 
I am saying, however, that we need not conclude, as Buchanan and Powell do, that 
inclusivists’ motivations for adopting their moral commitments have been only (or even 
primarily) moral. For status-enhancing motivations can also account for inclusivists’ adoption of 
their moral commitments regardless of their exercise of their moral capacities. 
 
 
Objection: Displaying one’s inclusivist commitments can perhaps enhance one’s status 
once there exist inclusivist groups to be signaled to. But your signaling explanation does not 
account for the emergence of such inclusivist groups or the historical anomalousness of 
inclusivism. Why and how did inclusivism emerge where and when it did? Surely signaling 
explanations alone cannot answer this question. 
 
 
Reply: This, I think, is perhaps the most important objection to my explanation, so I shall 
not give it short shrift. 
As I have said, “inclusivism” and “exclusivism” are relative terms. Though the British 
abolitionists were inclusivists relative to their contemporaries, they were exclusivists relative to 
us; by and large, their inclusivism concerning slavery did not extend to their views concerning 
gender and racial inequality, the nature of marriage, and other contemporary inclusivist issues. 
(William Wilberforce, however, perhaps the best known of the British abolitionists, helped 
establish the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.) Their inclusivism had to do first 
and foremost with an institution (slavery) towards which their contemporaries and predecessors 
were already somewhat ambivalent. The emergence of their abolitionist inclusivism, then, was 
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not the emergence of something altogether sui generis, but of something more inclusivist from 
something less so. 
In other words, abolitionist inclusivism was an ideological development which did not 
come out of the blue but rather from the remolding and recasting of existing resources within 
certain ideological traditions—as Anglicanism, for instance, came from the remolding and 
recasting of existing resources within Roman Catholicism. Such ideological developments are a 
commonplace of human history. No ideological tradition of any kind is altogether static, and yet 
ideological traditions, rather like Quinean webs of belief, seem usually to change gradually, 
marginally, and from within as their existing parts are redefined and repurposed. The abolitionist 
(and other) beginnings of the inclusivist shift, then, were not anomalous, but rather incidences of 
typical ideological developments. 
But what does an ideological development look like? And what ideological tradition did 
(eighteenth-century) inclusivism remold? I shall answer these questions by considering this case 
of British abolitionism. Because Buchanan and Powell consider British abolitionism “arguably 
… the first social movement in the modern sense” and one of the best examples of an inclusivist 
movement whose members’ motivations cannot be accounted for by evolutionary theory, I shall 
spell out at length my reasons for believing that status-enhancing motivations can largely 
account for it.64 I take it that the story I tell about British abolitionism can be retold, mutatis 
mutandis, about other inclusivist movements. 
Slavery was hardly a universally lauded practice in Britain leading up to abolition. 
William the Conqueror forbade the export of slaves from England in 1066,65 the Council of 
 
64 Buchanan and Powell 32. 
65 Internet Medieval Sourcebook, “Laws of William the Conqueror,” 
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/source/will1-lawsb.asp. 
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London abolished the slave trade altogether in 1102,66 and by the end of the twelfth century 
chattel slavery in England had all but disappeared.67 Much earlier, of course, Aristotle and other 
ancient philosophers and statesmen had already shown a certain ambivalence towards slavery; 
and so had the Church, in view of the Christian tradition’s many inclusivist or proto-inclusivist 
themes of universal justice, equality, and liberation. The seeds of British abolitionism were sown 
in both sacred and secular ethical thought long before they were reaped. 
Why, then, were they reaped when they were—centuries after the disappearance of 
domestic slavery in Britain? My answer to this question draws together three main 
considerations. 
First, as Buchanan and Powell say, inclusivism is something of a luxury good. Though I 
think that Buchanan and Powell exaggerate the cost of inclusivist commitments, they do seem on 
average more materially costly to signal than exclusivist commitments, and therefore 
“affordable” only in more prosperous societies. It is therefore no coincidence that the inclusivist 
anomaly in Britain and elsewhere began with “the spread of market [relations] and the Industrial 
Revolution” (among social reformers some of whom were very wealthy), or that the British 
Empire abolished slavery just as it neared the peak of its wealth and might—precisely when it 
could most easily afford to do so.68 
Second, abolitionism emerged first and foremost among certain Protestant sects 
established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—Dissenters (i.e., non-Anglican British 
 
 
66 Internet Medieval Sourcebook, “Decrees on Sale of Unfree Christians, c. 922-1171,” 
https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1171latrsale.asp. 
67 See inter alia Pollock and Maitland 39: “Slavery … existed, and was fully recognized, in England until the twelfth 
century.” Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 
(Cambridge: 1898). 
68 Buchanan and Powell 26. 
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Protestants)—whose ideologies emphasized egalitarianism (for instance, in their frequent 
commitment to congregationalist rather than episcopal polity) more than did Anglican or 
Catholic ideologies. Indeed, it would be only a slight exaggeration to call British (and early 
American) abolitionism a movement of Dissenters, and especially of Quakers—whose sect’s 
very name, “Religious Society of Friends,” of course betrayed their egalitarianism. Though 
Anglicans made up over ninety percent of the English population until about 1800,69 many if not 
most prominent abolitionists were Dissenters by faith. “Leading antislavery agitators” in 
Bradford, for instance, “included Baptists, Quakers (the Society of Friends had formed their own 
national abolition committee in 1783) and Unitarians, amongst others”—and much the same 
could be said of other English cities and towns.70 The Society for Effecting the Abolition of the 
Slave Trade, established in 1787, had nine Quakers as founding members and only three 
Anglicans—and at least one of those Anglicans, Granville Sharp, had been influenced in his 
views by his correspondence with the early Quaker abolitionist Anthony Benezet. 
Dissenters, then, played a disproportionate role in British abolitionism—a role which (I 
should note) seems hard to square with Buchanan and Powell’s explanation of the inclusivist 
anomaly. Buchanan and Powell link inclusivism to sociopolitical developments like the rule of 
law, the emergence of markets, and property rights, which for the most part account only for 
different inter-societal rates of inclusivism, not for different intra-societal rates—in particular, 
different rates among Anglicans and Dissenters. Both Anglicans and Dissenters, after all, lived 
under the same rule of law in the same commercializing and industrializing society. If the 
average Dissenter was wealthier than the average Anglican—Quakers were known for the many 
69 Clive Field, “Counting Religion in England and Wales: The Long Eighteenth Century, c. 1680-c. 1840,” Journal 
of Ecclesiastical History 63.4 2012: 711. 
70 James R.T.E. Gregory, “Historical Perspectives on the Transatlantic Slave Trade in Bradford, Yorkshire: 
Abolitionist Activity c.1787-1865” 2013: 3. 
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wealthy bankers, manufacturers, and tradesmen within their ranks—wealth alone hardly 
guaranteed abolitionist leanings. Instead, abolition seems to have emerged not proportionately 
among wealthy Britons of all stripes but disproportionately among Quakers and other Dissenters. 
(When it spread to Anglicans, moreover, it spread to those Anglicans like William Wilberforce 
who sympathized with Dissenters and with Methodist and other evangelical reformers in the 
Church of England.) Abolitionism therefore seems to be an eighteenth-century ideological 
development within Dissenting Christianity—itself an ideological development within 
Anglicanism—which, catalyzed by favorable economic conditions, drew upon egalitarian and 
other proto-inclusivist resources within that tradition to remold it. 
Third, and most important, abolitionism seems to have emerged within Dissenting 
Christianity as a status-enhancing competitive demonstration of virtue, which are common across 
the animal kingdom. Consider, for instance, the competitive altruism of Arabian babblers. These 
birds 
compete to help each other and the group—often aggressively so. For 
example, not only do higher-ranked babblers give food to lower-ranked 
babblers, sometimes they force it down the throats of unwilling birds! 
Similar jockeying takes place for the ‘privilege’ of performing other 
altruistic behaviors. 
 
If the goal of these behaviors is to be helpful, why do the babblers waste 
effort competing to perform them? … The answer … is that altruistic 
babblers develop a kind of ‘credit’ among their groupmates—what 
[ornithologist Amotz] Zahavi calls prestige status.71 
 
Babblers compete with one another for status by helping their fellow babblers, thereby signaling 
their usefulness and hardihood. Humans likewise compete with one another for status by 
signaling not only their usefulness and hardihood but also their compassion, piety, and 
71 Hanson and Simler 21-22. 
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virtuousness. In eighteenth-century Britain, abolitionist commitments could reliably (if only 
unconsciously) signal greater virtuousness—even among Anglicans and other non-Dissenters. It 
is for this reason that such commitments could spread across Britain and later on across the 
world. 
Why could abolitionist commitments signal greater virtuousness? Recall that views on 
slavery in Britain and the Christian West had always been somewhat ambivalent. Rarely had 
slavery been defended as a “positive good” (to borrow John C. Calhoun’s infamous phrase); 
instead, it was more often defended as a necessary evil on grounds better described as prudential 
than moral. Defenders of slavery, though they were defenders of the status quo, were not well 
placed to claim the moral high ground, and so it is little surprise that abolitionists could 
effectively signal their greater virtuousness through their abolitionist commitments. Early 
abolitionists, after all, were not reinventing the (already recognized) virtues of compassion, piety, 
and the like, but rather demonstrating their superior exemplification of them—and demonstrating 
slaveholders’ inferior virtuousness, coldheartedness, and greed. Thus abolitionists could claim 
the moral high ground, and therefore the status high ground, by displaying their (relatively) 
inclusivist commitments—thereby all but guaranteeing their eventual success. (Buchanan and 
Powell begin The Evolution of Moral Progress by quoting the Dissenting Christian minister 
Theodore Parker’s proclamation that the arc of the moral universe is long but bends toward 
justice. It seems to me truer to history to say that the arc of the moral universe is long but bends 
toward status.) 
Such status competition between disproportionately non-Anglican abolitionists and 
disproportionately Anglican defenders of slavery seems linked to previous conflicts in Britain 
like the English Civil Wars, which pitted the disproportionately Dissenting Roundheads against 
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the disproportionately Anglican Cavaliers. It seems to me no coincidence that abolitionism 
succeeded as Anglican influence in England was beginning to wane, and likely that at least some 
abolitionists were motivated by anti-Anglican and anti-Tory sentiments (as, for instance, James 
Gregory’s research suggests).72 Abolitionist commitments seem to me to have been status- 
enhancing not only for individual abolitionists but also for certain ideological groups jockeying 
with other ideological groups for political influence and power. 
In sum: Abolitionism emerged within certain Christian traditions as a status-enhancing 
ideological development under historical and environmental conditions favorable to its 
emergence and success. Once abolitionist and other inclusivist commitments had become part of 
recognized ideologies—not just religious ideologies, but political and moral ideologies like 
liberalism and utilitarianism—later inclusivists could draw upon inclusivist resources within 
such ideologies to build upon earlier inclusivist successes and follow their forerunners’ example 
by signaling their virtuousness through inclusivist commitments. Inclusivism therefore seems to 
have benefitted from a kind of positive feedback loop—so much so that new and 
paradigmatically inclusivist virtues like tolerance and egalitarianism themselves eventually 
became worth signaling. 
Such, in brief, is my account of the emergence of inclusivism, at least in the Anglophone 
world. The story of inclusivism’s emergence on the European continent is somewhat different; in 
France, for instance, early inclusivism seems to have taken a more irreligious and anti-clerical 
tack. But I think much the same story I have told about British abolitionism could be told about 
any other inclusivist movement. Inclusivism emerged as a status-enhancing development within 
 
72 See Gregory 3: “[A]ntislavery activity [in Bradford] can be seen … as part of the awakening of a Liberal party in 
Bradford. This Liberalism was nonconformist in its religious background, reacting to the domination of the town by 
an Anglican and Tory elite.” 
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certain ideological traditions under environmental conditions favorable to its emergence and 
success—the status-enhancing motivations for which are accounted for by evolutionary theory. 
 
 
Objection: To quote Buchanan and Powell: 
 
It is true that many abolitionists joined the movement at least in part 
because they had come to a new understanding of what is was to be a 
Christian, repudiating the traditional acquiescence of Christianity in 
slavery. But it would be hard to make the case that this new understanding 
… came about primarily if not exclusively through the development of 
religious thought as a phenomenon independent of the economic, cultural, 
social and political changes we have emphasized. 
 
Instead, it is more likely that secular, Enlightenment ideas, along with 
selection for inclusivist moral responses prompted by the favorable 
socioeconomic and political conditions of British society noted above, 
prompted many Christians to reinterpret what it was to be a Christian, 
focusing the exercise of the capacity for open-ended normativity on the 
character of their religious identity. … To our knowledge, no credible 
contemporary historian of the British abolitionist movement assigns the 
role of a primary cause to internal developments in Christian thought.73 
 
Reply: Why would “secular, Enlightenment ideas” have persuaded Dissenters so much 
more than they did Anglicans? I do not see how Buchanan and Powell could answer this question 
without acknowledging (among other things) the egalitarian themes already present in Dissenter 
ideology. I of course freely concede that religious thought, like all kinds of thought, has never 
been independent of economic, cultural, social, and political changes—nor have such changes 
ever been altogether independent of religious thought. So I do not see how this concession 
undermines my account of the origins of British abolitionism. 
 
 
 
73 Buchanan and Powell 327-328. 
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It seems to me, moreover, that the path to the Enlightenment was paved by developments 
in Christian thought like the repudiation of Scholasticism, and that eighteenth-century “secular, 
Enlightenment ideas” cannot be neatly untangled from eighteenth-century Christian ones. (In 
particular, the moral commitments of the non-Christian Enlightenment thinkers do not seem to 
me obviously more inclusivist than those of the Christians.) In other words, the Enlightenment 
seems to me an ideological development within Western Christian thought. Even if British 
abolitionism came out of the Enlightenment, then, it still seems to me to have come (if only 
indirectly) out of the Christian ideological tradition. For the Enlightenment itself came out of that 
tradition as well. 
In the end, it does not seem to me merely coincidental that eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century Britain was “a devout Christian society” (Gregory, 12) or that the most 
inclusivist countries in the world today are roughly the same countries that make up what was 
once known as Protestant Europe.74 It seems to me to be the case—though I do not know how to 
prove it—that the resources of the Christian tradition (and even more so the Protestant tradition, 
and most of all the Dissenting Protestant tradition) were especially ripe for inclusivist ideological 
development. Though these resources are certainly not the only causes of inclusivism, I do not 
think inclusivism’s uneven geographic spread can be explained by non-religious environmental 
conditions alone. 
 
 
Objection: Inclusivism has spread far beyond its supposed roots in fringe Protestant sects; 
since the eighteenth century, it has made steady (if not entirely uninterrupted) cultural and 
74 Gregory 12. See also Gregory 12-13: “The emphasis on the religious dimension to emancipation, for a devout 
Christian society as early nineteenth-century Britain was, was important, and Bradford Baptists, Methodists and 
other denominationalists were active in missionary activity which involved them in guiding the ‘lately emancipated 
Negroes to spiritual emancipation’ .... The campaign was seen as a Christian one, against those who would twist the 
Bible, or justify great moral breaches through the ‘miserable doctrines of expediency.’” 
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political inroads. Hence, even if your account of the emergence of inclusivism is right, the 
question remains: Why has inclusivism been so successful, and spread so quickly? 
 
 
Reply: The fringe Protestant sects among which abolitionism emerged have played an 
enormously influential role in the past three hundred years of Western and global history. Many 
of the widely respected institutions they founded—including most of the Ivy League, not to 
mention the United States of America—have aided, abetted, and propagated inclusivism since 
their founding. Even in the eighteenth century, when they were still subjects of religious 
discrimination, they and their sympathizers were very influential. 
Since then, their influence has only grown, as inclusivist political factions aligned with 
the Dissenters have defeated their exclusivist rivals in several important conflicts: the English 
Civil Wars, the rebellion of the American colonies, the North’s victory in the American Civil 
War, and the Allies’ victory in World War II, among others. The outcome of these conflicts has 
usually been increased inclusivist (and Dissenter) influence and success. Inclusivism, then, much 
like Christianity or Islam, has spread in part through its military and political victories, which 
have only increased the status-enhancing effect of inclusivist commitments. History, we are told, 
is written by the victors; one might also say that status is determined by the victors. Had the 
outcome of any of the aforementioned conflicts differed—had the Axis won World War II, for 
instance, or the South the Civil War—I expect that inclusivism’s spread would have been 
retarded if not reversed. 
One good example of this effect of political and military victory on inclusivist spread, I 
think, is the post-World War II enshrinement of human rights doctrine in various constitutions. (I 
choose this example in part because Buchanan and Powell discuss it at some length.) This 
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enshrinement seems to me more or less the enshrinement of the ideology of the victorious states 
of World War II—recall that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council are that war’s five main victorious states (or their successor states)—especially of the 
state, the United States, which came out of that war least scathed and most powerful. 
“The very existence and success of the human rights movement,” Buchanan and Powell 
argue, are evidence of “a robust, broad-based moral consensus, rather than the result of weaker 
nations being brow-beaten by more powerful ones into merely ‘assenting’ rather than consenting 
to a system of human rights.”75 It seems to me, however, that Buchanan and Powell too quickly 
rule out another explanation: It was diplomatically advantageous for most states to display a 
commitment to human rights—what would they have signaled by not displaying such a 
commitment?—and therefore to vote in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(while frequently and furtively violating that declaration). (As Richard Miller and others have 
documented, the United States’ offenses in this respect have been especially egregious— 
especially because the United States has often cited other states’ supposed violations of human 
rights as a pretext for military intervention.)76 I doubt whether the “robust, broad-based moral 
consensus” which Buchanan and Powell describe could ever have arisen without significant 
social and political pressures from American and other Western political elites, and I suspect that 
such pressures have done much since World War II to accelerate official the spread of 
inclusivism. (Buchanan and Powell contend that certain “extremist political elites” can have “a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Buchanan and Powell 311. 
76 See especially Miller 181-209. Richard W. Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: 
2013). 
77 Buchanan and Powell 221. 
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dominant interest in provoking exclusivist moral responses in others.”77 I agree, and only add 
that certain other elites can have a dominant interest in promoting inclusivism.) 
Moreover, economic and technological progress seem only to have accelerated 
 
inclusivism’s spread. Besides making inclusivist commitments of all kinds more affordable, 
economic and technological progress seem also to have reduced the cost of specific inclusivist 
commitments; for instance, the invention of birth control pills and discovery of antibiotics seem 
to have reduced the cost of the Sexual Revolution. Since economic and technological progress 
have been been fairly continuous since the eighteenth century, inclusivism’s fairly continuous 
spread since then is little surprise. 
 
 
Objection: But haven’t inclusivist commitments still been prohibitively costly all along? 
 
Couldn’t the British abolitionists have enhanced their status more cheaply by signaling their 
virtuousness in some more cost-effective manner? 
 
 
Reply: How costly was it for a non-slaveholding abolitionist to advocate for abolition? 
The British abolitionists themselves did not pay out twenty million pounds to their slaveholding 
peers. It seems to me that most inclusivists, like most members of almost all ideological groups, 
display their ideological commitments fairly cost-effectively—without, for instance, lowering 
their standards of living or significantly disrupting the patterns of their lives. Indeed, most 
inclusivists, ideological commitments notwithstanding, still clearly prioritize the interests of 
members of their non-ideological ingroups: neighbors, friends, relatives, and (most of all) 
themselves. As Buchanan and Powell acknowledge, “the combination of in-group 
78 Buchanan and Powell 130. 
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favoritism/empathy and out-group antagonism/antipathy” is still “among the most cross- 
culturally robust features of human moral psychology” three centuries after the beginning of the 
inclusivist anomaly.78 
Naturally, extremely costly inclusivist signals exist—but so do extremely costly signals 
of all kinds of ideological commitments. Buchanan and Powell have yet to show, I think, that 
inclusivism is uniquely strategically disadvantageous or fitness-reducing: more so, say, than 
ascetic or socialist or human-sacrificing ideologies. I therefore see little reason to follow 
Buchanan and Powell in giving inclusivism its own distinct explanation. Inclusivism’s costs do 
not seem to me very much out of the ordinary. 
Furthermore, even if the widespread adoption of certain inclusivist commitments within 
societies would in the long run decrease their members’ average reproductive fitness, those 
commitments could still be cheap enough to serve as effective status-enhancing signals for many 
of their members—in which case those members’ inclusivist motivations would be accounted for 
by evolutionary theory. Of course, other members of these societies might find such inclusivist 
commitments prohibitively costly, much as many slaveholders in eighteenth-century Britain 
must have found abolitionist commitments. But these members’ rejection of inclusivist 
commitments alone would not suffice to prevent inclusivism’s emergence, spread, and political 
success. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 
Let us take stock of what has been said. 
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The inclusivist anomaly admits of evolutionary explanation just as exclusivism does. At 
least since the Agricultural Revolution, humans have sought to enhance their status in part by 
displaying ideological commitments, including (more recently) inclusivist commitments. Their 
motivation to do so has a fairly clear evolutionary explanation: Displaying certain ideological 
commitments in certain societies could reliably signal virtuousness and (therefore) status, and 
enhanced status reliably tracked enhanced fitness in the EEA. 
Thus inclusivism emerged and spread as a status-enhancing development within certain 
ideological traditions under environmental conditions favorable to its emergence and spread. So 
Buchanan and Powell’s explanation of the so-called inclusivist anomaly in The Evolution of 
Moral Progress is unnecessary. To explain that anomaly, we need not suppose that COEN exists 
(even if it does); we need only look to the important status-enhancing functions of ideological 
commitments. The inclusivist anomaly, then, is not truly an anomaly but the result of 
environmental changes that have taken place since the Protestant Reformation—first in Europe, 
and later all around the world. Because (according to my explanation of this anomaly) there were 
status-enhancing motivations for bringing it about, the motivations for bringing it about are 
accounted for by evolutionary theory. So my explanation is (at least broadly speaking) an 
evolutionary one. 
I have offered my explanation explicitly as a provisional sketch, many parts of which 
remain to be filled in or revised. (For instance, I have not yet said anything about the positive 
utility we receive from our altruistic endeavors—what economist James Andreoni has called the 
“warm glow” effect—as a partial explanation of inclusivist altruism.)79 I am confident, however, 
in all my sketch’s broad strokes. In particular, it seems to me that the role status-enhancing 
79 See for example Andreoni 1447. James Andreoni, “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and 
Ricardian Influence,” Journal of Political Economy 97.6 1989: 1447-1458. 
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motivations play in our social lives—hinted at, in different ways, by thinkers as various as 
Glaucon, Hume, and Nietzsche—can hardly be overstated: “[T]he deeper logic of many of our 
strangest and most unique behaviors may lie in their value as signals” in social competitions for 
status.80 
I close with some quick observations about the importance of understanding the 
inclusivist anomaly. 
There are many reasons to want a historically and scientifically informed understanding 
understanding of the inclusivist anomaly. One which Buchanan and Powell point out is that such 
an understanding may help us foresee and thwart threats to our societies’ inclusivist 
commitments. Another (which I have already mentioned) is that the inclusivist anomaly is one of 
the most striking events in human history—comparable, in my view, to the birth of a new 
religious tradition. 
But perhaps the most important reason to want such an understanding of the inclusivist 
anomaly is to gain a better understanding of our own inclusivist commitments. If our ideological 
lives are not to become self-congratulatory or short-sighted, we will need to own up to all the 
status-enhancing and other motivations underlying our ideological commitments, and examine 
the many non-rational forces which have shaped them. If we do, we may discover that we are not 
so different from our exclusivist contemporaries, or even our exclusivist forebears. We may 
discover that there is nothing new under the sun—not even ourselves.81 
 
 
 
 
 
80 Hanson and Simler 39. 
81 I thank Jerry Postema, Luc Bovens, Geoff Sayre-McCord, and others for their valuable comments on earlier 
versions of this essay. 
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